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Illusory Due Process: The Broken Student 
Loan Hearing System 
Deanne Loonin* 
Student loan collection hearings should be the primary gateway to relief for borrowers in 
default, but the system is profoundly broken. The author presents case examples, available 
data, and responses from industry surveys to describe how student loan collection hearings offer 
no more than an illusion of due process. The later sections present reform proposals to improve 
the existing hearing system, including eliminating private contractor outsourcing and increasing 
government accountability and oversight. Recognizing that it is counterproductive to try to fix 
the hearing process without tackling systemic issues, the final section includes a summary of 
broad reform measures aimed at ending the current debt-fueled federal student aid system. 
  
 
* Attorney and advocate for student loan borrowers, including as an attorney at the Legal Services 
Center at Harvard Law School’s Project on Predatory Student Lending, and as the former Director of 
the National Consumer Law Center’s Student Loan Borrower Assistance Project. Special thanks to 
Elizabeth Renuart and Maggie O’Grady for providing valuable insights and comments on earlier drafts 
of this article and to industry contacts for their assistance. Thanks also to the Student Borrower 
Protection Center for its support. For inspiration to keep fighting for student borrowers and their 
families, I thank my colleagues at the Project on Predatory Student Lending and our clients who are 
trying to improve their lives while so unfairly bearing the burdens of our country’s broken student aid 
system. The author is solely responsible for the content of this Article. 
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INTRODUCTION 
There are currently about forty-three million federal student loan borrowers 
with outstanding federal student loan debt of $1.5 trillion.1 A shocking number of 
these borrowers are struggling with repayment, with many sinking into default.2 
Although student loan debt burdens impact all sectors of society, low-income 
borrowers and borrowers of color suffer disproportionately.3 Other groups 
 
1. Teddy Nykiel, 2019 Student Loan Debt Statistics, NERDWALLET (Dec. 20, 2019), 
https://www.nerdwallet.com/article/loans/student-loans/student-loan-debt [https://perma.cc/ 
D4LF-WYHS]; Scott Jaschik, Outstanding Student Loan Portfolio Now Tops $1.5 Trillion, 
INSIDE HIGHER ED ( Jan. 6, 2020), https://www.insidehighered.com/quicktakes/2020/01/06/ 
outstanding-student-loan-portfolio-now-tops-15-trillion [https://perma.cc/L3KU-RKFY]. 
2. According to a 2019 study, one-quarter of all student loan borrowers defaulted over a  
twenty-year period, including about half of all African American borrowers and a third of Latinx 
borrowers. LAURA SULLIVAN, TATJANA MESCHEDE, THOMAS SHAPIRO & FERNANDA ESCOBAR, 
INST. ON ASSETS & SOC. POL’Y, STALLING DREAMS: HOW STUDENT DEBT IS DISRUPTING LIFE 
CHANCES AND WIDENING THE RACIAL WEALTH GAP (2019), https://heller.brandeis.edu/iasp/pdfs/ 
racial-wealth-equity/racial-wealth-gap/stallingdreams-how-student-debt-is-disrupting-lifechances.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/N56X-KEF3]. 
3. For example, African American students are far more likely to borrow than their white peers 
(seventy-eight percent vs. fifty-seven percent) and to default on those loans (forty-nine percent  
vs. twenty-one percent). Ben Miller, New Federal Data Show a Student Loan Crisis for African American 
Borrowers, CTR. FOR AM. PROGRESS (Oct. 16, 2017, 9:00 AM), https:// 
www.americanprogress.org/issues/education-postsecondary/news/2017/10/16/440711/new-federal- 
data-show-student-loan-crisis-african-american-borrowers/ [https://perma.cc/Y3AU-9BWE]. 
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particularly burdened by student loan default include veterans, first-generation 
college students, students without traditional high school diplomas, and students 
with disabilities.4 
This Article focuses on struggling borrowers and their experiences seeking 
relief through the student loan collection hearing process. These hearings, in theory, 
allow borrowers facing collection to raise claims and defenses, including challenges 
to loan enforceability. The hearings should be the primary gateway to relief for 
borrowers in default. Instead, as described in this Article, the hearings offer no more 
than an illusion of due process.  
By allowing the broken hearing system to continue, the government has 
effectively eliminated an essential pathway to relief for borrowers facing default. 
This hits borrowers particularly hard because of the broad and long-lasting 
consequences of default. Our current federal student loan system is extraordinarily 
punitive, more so than other federal and private debt collection programs.5 The 
government can garnish a borrower’s wages without a judgment, seize tax refunds 
(even earned income tax credits), and portions of federal payments such as Social 
Security, all without a statute of limitations.6 In addition to facing collection, 
students in default lose the ability to restart their educations through new federal 
loans or grants and may even have their academic transcripts withheld.7 These 
policies prevent individuals from getting a fresh start and hammer students who do 
not succeed the first time around.8 These financial burdens of debt inhibit our 
country’s ability to achieve its higher education goals but so do the psychological 
burdens. Borrowers can end up carrying student debt burdens throughout their 
lives, impacting not only their own futures but next generations as well.9  
It should not be surprising that the government generally uses its powerful 
extrajudicial collection tools rather than expending the time and resources to sue a 
borrower in court.10 From July through September 2018, the Department of 
 
Students who identify as American Indian or Alaska Native and Hispanic or Latino students also default 
in rates higher than national averages. Colleen Campbell, The Forgotten Faces of Student Loan Default, 
CTR. FOR AM. PROGRESS (Oct. 16, 2018, 9:45 AM), https://www.americanprogress.org/ 
issues/education-postsecondary/news/2018/10/16/459394/forgotten-faces-student-loan-default/ 
[https://perma.cc/R4XM-HCJC]. 
4. Campbell, supra note 3. 
5. See Deanne Loonin & Julie Margetta Morgan, Aiming Higher: Looking Beyond Completion to 
Restore the Promise of Higher Education, 48 J.L. & EDUC. 423, 435 (2019). 
6. DEANNE LOONIN, ABBY SHAFROTH & PERSIS YU, STUDENT LOAN LAW § 8.5.3 (Nat’l 
Consumer Law Ctr. ed., 6th ed. 2019); 20 U.S.C. § 1095a (eliminating the statute of limitations). 
7. THE INST. FOR COLL. ACCESS & SUCCESS, THE SELF-DEFEATING CONSEQUENCES OF 
STUDENT LOAN DEFAULT 2 (2018), https://ticas.org/wp-content/uploads/legacy-files/pub_files/ 
ticas_default_issue_brief.pdf [https://perma.cc/78RS-GF9T]. 
8. Loonin & Morgan, supra note 5, at 447. 
9. See, e.g., Adam Harris, The Lifelong Cost of Getting a For-Profit Education, ATLANTIC  
(Aug. 29, 2018), https://www.theatlantic.com/education/archive/2018/08/for-profit-college-
students-are-saddled-with-debt-they-cant-pay-back/568834/ [https://perma.cc/W6QE-WMXS].  
10. The Department of Education does, however, sue in some cases. These cases are 
disproportionally concentrated in areas that are home to communities of color. MARGARET MATTES 
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Education’s (the Department) collection agencies seized almost $230 million in 
wages from borrowers in default.11 This was about nine percent of all collections.12 
Most borrowers in garnishment persist in that status for at least five to ten years.13  
In theory, most struggling borrowers should be able to find some relief 
through an array of programs ranging from affordable and flexible repayment plans 
to discharges for disability or school-related fraud.14 The school-related fraud 
discharge category includes a right to “borrower defense,” an assertion that the loan 
is void or unenforceable because of school misconduct.15  
Borrowers generally must affirmatively apply for these various relief 
programs.  
This Article highlights the importance of student loan collection hearings as a 
pathway to relief for borrowers and the range of ways in which the program is 
broken. Part II describes the legal framework of the student loan collection hearing 
system. Part III presents the reality of the borrower hearing experience and how the 
government offers no more than an illusion of due process. Part IV summarizes the 
doctrine of inherently governmental functions and how it developed to address the 
risks of privatization of critical government functions. This Part also discusses the 
prevalence of private contractor involvement in the student loan collection hearing 
system, concluding that these hearing functions should be classified as inherently 
governmental functions. This is followed by a discussion in Part V of the problems 
with government administration of the hearing process and lack of accountability. 
The last two sections present reform proposals starting with ways to improve the 
existing system in Part VI. Recognizing that it is counterproductive to try to fix the 
hearing process without tackling systemic issues, the final section includes a 
 
& PERSIS YU, NAT’L CONSUMER L. CTR., INEQUITABLE JUDGMENTS: EXAMINING RACE AND 
FEDERAL STUDENT LOAN COLLECTION LAWSUITS (2019), https://www.nclc.org/images/pdf/ 
student_loans/report-inequitable-judgments-april2019.pdf [https://perma.cc/9ZRV-PX5G]. 
11. The Department publishes recovery rates for each collection agency, broken into categories 
for total collection, consolidation, rehabilitation, voluntary payments, and garnishment. There is not a 
separate category for non-garnishment involuntary collection. Default Rates, FED. STUDENT AID, 
https://studentaid.gov/data-center/student/default [https://perma.cc/Z3UF-S383 ] ( last visited  
Oct. 3, 2020). There is also publicly available data by type of collection, including offset, for the now 
defunct guaranteed loan program (also known as “FFEL”). For the 2019 fiscal year through June, 
FFEL garnishment comprised nearly 7% of total FFEL loan collections, amounting to close to $380 
million seized from borrowers. Treasury offsets comprised 6.2% of FFEL loan collections, equaling 
just over $340 million. FFEL Program Lender and Guaranty Agency Reports, FED. STUDENT AID, 
https://studentaid.gov/data-center/lender-guaranty [https://perma.cc/G4S6-3LY7] ( last visited  
Oct. 3, 2020) (June 2019 results). 
12. Id. 
13. AnnaMaria Andriotis, Student Debt Takes a Bite Out of More Paychecks, WALL ST. J. ( June 
13, 2014, 6:52 PM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/student-debt-takes-a-bite-out-of-more-paychecks-
1402699974 [https://perma.cc/D2VE-EFVD]. 
14. See generally LOONIN, SHAFROTH & YU, supra note 6. 
15. 20 U.S.C. § 1087e(h); 34 C.F.R. § 685.222 (2020) (setting forth borrower defenses to Direct 
Loans). For information about borrower defenses for FFEL loans, see LOONIN, SHAFROTH & YU, 
supra note 6, § 10.6.4.3.  
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summary of broad reform measures aimed at ending the current debt-fueled federal 
student aid system.  
I. LEGAL FRAMEWORK OF THE STUDENT LOAN COLLECTION  
HEARING PROCESS 
The statutory authority for student loan collection hearings differs depending 
on the type of loan and type of collection action. Since 2010, the government 
originates nearly all federal loans through the Direct Loan program.16 However, 
there are still a large percentage of outstanding loans from the older guaranteed loan 
program, also known as the Federal Family Education Loan program or FFEL.17  
Before submitting a debt to the Department of Treasury for tax or benefits 
offset, the Department of Education must certify that the debt is legally 
enforceable.18 For FFEL loans, the Department delegates to guaranty agencies the 
authority to initiate tax offsets for loans still held by the guaranty agency.19  
With respect to garnishment, the government can seize up to fifteen percent 
of a defaulted borrower’s disposable pay.20 The FFEL process largely mirrors the 
Direct Loan process with a few important exceptions. For example, the garnishment 
authority for FFEL is in the Higher Education Act (HEA).21 In contrast, the 
government authority for garnishment of Direct Loans is derived from the Debt 
Collection Improvement Act (DCIA).22  
For both the Direct Loan and FFEL programs, the statute and regulations 
describe notice requirements, deadlines for borrower hearing requests, and minimal 
criteria for hearing officers. There is also informal guidance on the hearing process, 
not all of which is publicly available.23 
There are deadlines for requesting hearings. For tax offset, in order to have 
the borrower’s objections to tax offset considered, the borrower must file a request 
 
16. In the Direct Loan program, the government, through the Department of Education, 
directly originates student loans. 
17. As of January 2020, the Direct Loan portfolio represented eighty-two percent of the federal 
student loan total, with FFEL at seventeen percent. Jaschik, supra note 1. 
18. 31 U.S.C. § 3720A(b); 31 C.F.R. § 285.2(d)(1)(i) (2020); 31 C.F.R. § 285.5(b), (d)(5) (2020). 
“Legally enforceable” means there has been a final agency determination that the debt, in the amount 
stated, is due, and there are no legal bars to collection by offset. 31 C.F.R. § 285.5(b).  
19. 31 U.S.C. § 3720A(a). Guaranty agencies are state or private nonprofit organizations that 
had agreements with the Department of Education to administer a loan guarantee program under the 
Higher Education Act. 34 C.F.R. § 682.200 (2020) (containing FFEL program definitions). 
20. 31 U.S.C. § 3720D(b)(1). 
21. 20 U.S.C § 1095a. 
22. 31 U.S.C. § 3720D. 
23. The Department provides instructions to collection agencies, including for offset and 
garnishment, in a handbook that is not publicly available. A redacted version from May 2016, obtained 
through a National Consumer Law Center (NCLC) Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) request, is 
posted online. FED. STUDENT AID, U.S. DEP’T OF EDUC., PCA PROCEDURES MANUAL FOR PRIVATE 
COLLECTION AGENCIES CONTRACTED BY FEDERAL STUDENT AID (2016) [hereinafter PCA 
HANDBOOK ], https://www.studentloanborrowerassistance.org/wp-content/uploads/2013/05/pca-
manual.pdf [https://perma.cc/86BN-UKBC]. 
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for review by the later of sixty-five days after the date of the notice or fifteen days 
after the borrower’s loan file is provided if the borrower exercises the right to 
request the loan file.24 The timely request for a hearing stops the offset until the 
hearing—and any further requests for review—have been exhausted.25 The 
government is not required to do so but has discretion to provide hearings for 
borrowers requesting them after these deadlines have expired.26 There are similar 
rules and authority for federal benefits offset with a few variations. For example, 
borrowers facing benefits offsets have fewer days to request hearings.27  
The timing rules are slightly different for garnishment. If the borrower 
requests a hearing on or before the thirtieth day after the mailing date of the notice 
of garnishment, the garnishment should not proceed until after the hearing.28 
Borrowers can still request hearings after that date—and regulations provide that 
the Department must still provide a hearing following an untimely request—but 
garnishment may proceed pending a hearing decision.29 
Unlike offset, there are rules regarding deadlines for issuance of garnishment 
decisions.30 The Department is required to issue a written decision no later than 
sixty days after receiving the request for hearing.31 If this deadline is not met, the 
Department must not issue a garnishment order until a hearing is held and  
decision rendered.32 
Borrowers may request oral hearings for both offset and garnishment but must 
submit the reasons why a review based only on the written submission would be 
insufficient.33 For Department-held loans, the Department has discretion whether 
to grant an oral hearing.34 In contrast, the FFEL garnishment regulations provide 
the borrower with the option of choosing an oral or written hearing.35 
 
24. 34 C.F.R. § 30.33(d)(1) (2020). 
25. 31 U.S.C. § 3720A(b). 
26. 34 C.F.R. § 30.24(c) (2020).  
27. Id. § 30.24(a)(1).  
28. 31 U.S.C. § 3720D(c)(1). The statute provides fifteen days, but the regulations state thirty. 
34 C.F.R. § 34.11(a)(1) (2020). The Department’s website also states a deadline of thirty days. If You 
Default on Your Federal Student Loan, the Loan May Be Placed with a Collection Agency, Which Will 
Then Contact You to Obtain Payment, FED. STUDENT AID [hereinafter Collections ], 
https://studentaid.gov/manage-loans/default/collections [https://perma.cc/EZY6-43PV] ( last 
visited Oct. 3, 2020). Hereafter, the citations to garnishment are all for the Direct Loan program.  
29. 31 U.S.C. § 3720D(c)(2); 34 C.F.R. § 34.11(c). 
30. For offset, the regulations for oral hearings do not include a deadline for decisions, but the 
regulations provide that the government must avoid unreasonable delays in the proceedings. 34  
C.F.R. § 30.26(c)(2) (2020).  
31. 34 C.F.R. § 34.16(a) (2020). 
32. Id. § 34.16(b). 
33. 34 C.F.R. § 30.25(b) (2020) (addressing offset); 34 C.F.R. § 34.9(a) (2020)  
(addressing garnishment). 
34. 34 C.F.R. § 34.9 (addressing garnishment); 34 C.F.R. § 30.25 (addressing offset). 
35. 34 C.F.R. § 682.410(b)(9)(i)(E)(2) (2020). 
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Borrowers may request hearings and raise claims or defenses regarding the 
existence, amount, enforceability, or past-due status of the debt.36 For garnishment, 
borrowers may also raise a defense if they have been continuously employed less 
than twelve months after involuntary separation from employment.37 The request 
for hearing forms list these claims and defenses, including the various statutory 
discharges such as closed school, false certification, and borrower defense.38 
Borrowers may also provide evidence at a hearing to prove that continued 
collection would cause a financial hardship. A successful hardship claim does not 
discharge or cancel the debt, but instead results in a temporary suspension of 
collection. The garnishment regulations specifically include a right to raise hardship 
to reduce or suspend collection.39 The Department has developed an administrative 
wage garnishment calculator for its contractors to use in making hardship 
determinations.40 In contrast, review based on financial hardship is not explicitly 
granted in the offset regulations. However, the Department and guaranty agencies 
have discretion to consider hardship claims for borrowers facing offset.41 
II. THE REALITY OF STUDENT LOAN COLLECTION HEARINGS 
A. Hearing Volume and Outcomes 
This Section and the following sections present findings from the limited 
public information that is available about hearings, including information from 
various Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) requests, a survey of industry 
 
36. 31 U.S.C. § 3720A(b)(2) (stating the agency must give an opportunity for borrowers facing 
offset to present evidence that debt is not past due or not legally enforceable); 34 C.F.R. § 30.22(b)(3)(ii) 
(2020) (addressing review of existence or amount of debt); 34 C.F.R. § 30.33(b)(3)(ii) (2020) (addressing 
review of existence, amount, enforceability, or past due status for tax offsets); 31 U.S.C. § 3720D(b)(5) 
(stating that the agency must give borrowers facing garnishment an opportunity for a hearing 
concerning the existence or amount of the debt); 34 C.F.R. § 34.6(c)(1) (2020) (addressing garnishment 
hearings on existence, amount, or current enforceability).  
37. 31 U.S.C. § 3720D(b)(6); 34 C.F.R. § 34.6(c)(3).  
38. The Department does not include these forms in its online library. Repayment Forms,  
FED. STUDENT AID, https://studentaid.gov/app/formLibrary.action?_ga=2.205759639.542323583. 
1532996021-1879680736.1424704777 [https://perma.cc/XQS7-V3L7] ( last visited Oct. 3, 2020). 
Recent hearing forms, however, are available on the National Consumer Law Center’s Student Loan 
Borrower Assistance website, Federal Student Loan Forms, STUDENT LOAN BORROWER ASSISTANCE, 
https://www.studentloanborrowerassistance.org/resources/important-forms/ [https://perma.cc/ 
G6XV-MMEG] ( last visited Oct. 3, 2020), and in the PCA Procedures Manual, PCA HANDBOOK, 
supra note 23.  
39. 34 C.F.R. §§ 34.24–34.25 (2020). 
40. PCA HANDBOOK, supra note 23, at 7.0 app. A (Administrative Wage Garnishment (AWG) 
Hardship Calculator Supplemental Instructions).  
41. Loan Servicing and Collection - Frequently Asked Questions, FED. STUDENT AID  
TOP-Q1, https://ifap.ed.gov/loan-servicing-and-collection-frequently-asked-questions#TOP-Q1 
[https://perma.cc/TUF9-D6P2] ( last visited Oct. 3, 2020). The Department has also posted a Social 
Security offset package for borrowers. FED. STUDENT AID, U.S. DEP’T OF EDUC., REQUEST TO 
STOP OR REDUCE OFFSET OF SOCIAL SECURITY BENEFITS, https://ifap.ed.gov/sites/default/files/ 
attachments/2019-09/ReqStopReduceOffsetSocSecBenefits.pdf [https://perma.cc/9LCM-Y3DW] 
( last visited Oct. 3, 2020). 
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participants, and advocates’ experiences representing borrowers. The responses to 
the industry survey demonstrate how difficult it is to accurately track the actual 
borrower experience. Most of the companies responding to the industry survey 
either did not track hearing volume and outcome information at all or did not make 
the information public.42  
There is, however, some information from a redacted version of the 
Department’s 2013 contract with the debt management and collections system 
contractor Maximus.43 The contract states that Maximus should expect 17,000 
garnishment hearings annually and nearly 6,000 annual offset hearings.44 In a 
separate 2015 FOIA response, the Department reported a total of 45,017 
garnishment hearings during the time period from January 2012 through May 2015, 
or approximately 1,097 each month.45 This is less than the 17,000 annual hearings 
the Department set as an expectation for Maximus in the 2013 contract.46 
The Department has published data showing hearing volume from earlier 
years for FFEL garnishments. In calendar year 2011, the Department estimated that 
there were 84,293 FFEL program borrowers whose loans were held by state 
guaranty agencies and for which the guaranty agency initiated administrative wage 
garnishment.47 The number was 159,912 for nonprofit guaranty agencies.48 For 
both types of guaranty agencies, the Department estimated that ten percent of 
 
42. The author sent a list of questions about student loan collection hearings to an industry 
contact in 2016. This contact distributed the questions to servicing and collection companies that all 
had some involvement with the hearing process. The industry contact collected the responses and sent 
them to the author. The responses were color coded by the type of agency/company, but without 
identifying the names of the companies. E-mail from author to industry contact (May 31, 2016, 11:45 
EST) [hereinafter Industry Survey ] (on file with author). The author separately contacted a private 
servicer/collector with the same list of questions. A total of five companies responded, including four 
from the industry contact and the one that the author contacted separately. The companies responding 
to the industry survey included one large and one small state-based guaranty agency, one large and one 
small nonprofit guaranty agency, and one private servicer/collector. The company that the author 
contacted separately reviewed its 2016 responses in 2019 and stated that they were still accurate. The 
industry contact, also in 2019, checked back with a number of agencies administering FFEL hearings 
and reported to the author that the agencies did not believe that there were changes since the 2016 
responses. All respondents requested anonymity. A redacted set of responses with no company 
identification information is on file with the author.  
43. The NCLC obtained a redacted copy of the Department’s debt management and collections 
system contract with Maximus. FOIA Request No. 18-001-49 F [hereinafter Maximus Contract ]. The 
Department’s response is dated November 8, 2018. Letter from Dep’t of Educ., to Nat’l Consumer  
L. Ctr. (Nov. 8, 2018) (on file with NCLC).  
44. Maximus Contract, supra note 43, at 23 app. 3 (DMCS Volumes). 
45. Letter from Larry Schwartztol, Am. C.L. Union, and Persis Yu, Nat’l Consumer L. Ctr., to 
U.S. Dep’t of Educ., Request Under Freedom of Information Act (May 7, 2015) [hereinafter ACLU  
& NCLC], https://www.aclu.org/sites/default/files/field_document/2015.05.07_aclu_nclc_foia_to_ 
dept_ed.pdf [https://perma.cc/5G27-DW3Y]. In the final response to the FOIA request, the 
Department provided data through September 2015, adjusting the total number of hearings to 47,484 
(or approximately 1,055 each month). 
46. Maximus Contract, supra note 43. 
47. Administrative Wage Garnishment (AWG)—Use of Third-Party Contractors, 78  
Fed. Reg. 65768, 65794–95 (Nov. 1, 2013). 
48. Id. 
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borrowers for which garnishment was initiated would request hearings.49 One of 
the industry respondents in the industry survey estimated a lower percentage, stating 
that about five percent of its student loan customers receive hearing notices  
request hearings.50  
The low hearing request rate is cause for concern because hearings are of little 
value if borrowers do not know about them or request them.51 Any deterrent effect 
on future bad acts is also unlikely with such low usage rates.52  
Only one of the agencies in our survey provided some data on garnishment 
hearing volume and outcomes. This large state-based guaranty agency provided 
information for calendar year 2015 regarding garnishment hearings. According to 
the agency’s response, of 4,710 hearings requested, most (eighty-six percent, or 
4,042) were cancelled and no garnishment occurred.53 The agency did not state the 
reason for cancellation in these cases.54 Further, the agency stated only that the 
garnishment was cancelled, not the underlying debt. This indicates that there was 
no final discharge of the loan in these cases and presumably the borrowers remained 
in default.55 Of the 4,710 hearings requested, hearings were held in only about 
fourteen percent of the cases (668 hearings).56 Of the 668 hearings, about  
thirty-nine percent resulted in full garnishment orders and thirty-four percent in 
partial garnishment orders. In twenty-six percent of cases where hearings were held, 
the agency and borrower agreed to a settlement and no garnishment occurred.57 
These settlements may have cancelled the debt, but the agency was not clear about 
this and did not respond to further inquiry.58 In general, this agency did not track 
by substantive defense raised. 
In a 2015 FOIA response, the Department provided data on objections 
borrowers raised in hearing requests.59 However, the Department acknowledged 
numerous problems with the data including overlap between different categories, 
leading to double counting of some results.60 It is nearly impossible to determine 
from the responses whether the Department considered substantive defenses when 
 
49. Id.  
50. Industry Survey, supra note 42. 
51. Vicki Lens, Bureaucratic Disentitlement After Welfare Reform: Are Fair Hearings the Cure?, 
12 GEO. J. ON POVERTY L. & POL’Y 13, 50–51 (2005).  
52. Id. 






59. ACLU & NCLC, supra note 45.  
60. Id. In the FOIA response, the Department also explained that the “offset request for review 
decision” field was never populated for the population analyzed. Letter from Dep’t of Educ. to  
Am. C.L. Union and Nat’l Consumer L. Ctr. (2015) (on file with NCLC). The Department used a  
work-around to discern offset data by decision type, acknowledging the incompleteness of this  
work-around because not all hearings had a decision tag, and in some cases the tags were  
ambiguous. Id. 
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hearings did occur. The Department reported a total of 45,017 garnishment 
hearings during the time period from January 2012 through May 2015.61 In about 
eleven percent of these cases (or 5,106), the garnishment was denied, although this 
does not mean that the loan itself was cancelled. In about 5.5% of the cases (or 
2,516), the Department stated that there was a favorable decision on grounds other 
than hardship.62 This is apparently not a discharge decision because the Department 
notes that these accounts were removed from garnishment but also that the 
government will “need to reinstate in the future.”63 About fifty-two percent of the 
cases resulted in an unfavorable decision for the borrower and full garnishment 
continued. Only a small percentage of cases resulted in a reduction in the amount 
or rate of garnishment. About twenty-five percent (or 11,288) resulted in a full, but 
temporary, hardship suspension.64  
B. Private Contractor Role  
For years, the Department has hired private contractors for a wide range of 
student aid services, including loan servicing, origination and collection.65 This 
appears to be the case with collection hearings as well because the Department 
outsources some key aspects of the hearing process largely to Maximus, the 
Department’s current default services contractor. Founded in 1975, Maximus has a 
long history of administering public benefits programs for the government, having 
secured the nation’s first privatized welfare contract in 1987 in Los Angeles.66 In 
2013, the Department announced a default management contract with Maximus 
valued at about $143.3 million with eight one-year option periods, amounting to a 
 
61. In the final response to the FOIA request, the Department provided data through 
September 2015, adjusting the total number of hearings to 47,484. Letter from Dep’t of Educ., supra 
note 60. 
62. Id. 
63. Industry Survey, supra note 42. 
64. See infra Section II.D. 
65. In addition to the contract with Maximus, for example, the Department awarded a five-year 
contract in 2019 to Accenture Federal Services for a new web portal and other customer services. 
Andrew Kreighbaum, Contract Awarded for New Student Borrower Website, INSIDE HIGHER ED  
(Feb. 22, 2019), https://www.insidehighered.com/quicktakes/2019/02/22/contract-awarded-new-
student-borrower-website [https://perma.cc/GD2U-XAA9]. The Accenture contract could be worth 
as much as $577 million over eight years. Id. The Department has also hired third-party private debt 
collectors for many years. The current list is available online. Collections, supra note 28. 
66. Tracie McMillan, How One Company Is Making Millions Off Trump’s War on the Poor, 
MOTHER JONES (Jan./Feb. 2019), https://www.motherjones.com/politics/2018/12/how-one-
company-is-making-millions-off-trumps-war-on-the-poor/ [https://perma.cc/MS7U-72ST]. 
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total estimated contract value of $848.4 million if all options are exercised.67 
Maximus took over the contract from ACS/Xerox.68  
A redacted version of the Maximus contract obtained through a FOIA request 
indicates that the Department relies heavily on Maximus to prepare and issue draft 
decisions for Department-held loans. The Department requires Maximus to 
complete a draft offset hearing response no later than October 31 of the year the 
pre-offset notice is mailed.69 The Department also requires Maximus to complete a 
draft garnishment hearing response no later than fifty-three calendar days from the 
postmark date for the hearing request.70 It is not clear who writes the final decisions. 
The Department also tasks Maximus with escalating for Department review internal 
correspondence of any garnishment hearing that appears to be overdue, defined as 
a hearing request that has been at the collection agency for more than thirty days, 
or more than seven days since the last update.71 This instruction contemplates that 
Maximus could be “working” the request. 
The Department’s collection agency handbook also shows how private 
contractors, in this case third-party collection agencies, are involved in the hearing 
process.72 The Department instructs collectors to determine the type of objection 
in the hearing request, use the garnishment hardship calculator for objections due 
to hardship, and send this information to Default Resolution Group for internal 
review and forward to Maximus.73 The Department instructs the collection agencies 
to check the system to see if the hearing request was received and processed by 
Maximus.74 Private contractors are involved in the FFEL hearing system as well, 
although in these cases, the FFEL regulations limit the extent to which collection 
agencies can participate in the garnishment process.75 
 
67. Press Release, Maximus, U.S. Department of Education, Office of Federal Student Aid, 
Awards Maximus a Contract to Help Administer the Defaulted Student Loan Debt Program (Oct. 1, 
2013), https://investor.maximus.com/news/news-details/2013/US-Department-of-Education-
Office-of-Federal-Student-Aid-Awards-MAXIMUS-a-Contract-to-Help-Administer-the-Defaulted-
Student-Loan-Debt-Program/default.aspx [https://perma.cc/7WL3-AGDU]. The contract number is 
ED-FSA-13-C-0021. Maximus is described on the Federal Student Aid website as the loan servicer for 
defaulted federal student loans over 360 days delinquent. Student Loan Delinquency and Default,  
FED. STUDENT AID, https://studentaid.gov/manage-loans/default [https://perma.cc/MA7U-S8G2] 
( last visited Oct. 3, 2020). 
68. The Department’s Inspector General cited the Department and ACS for a wide range of 
problems and deficiencies with the debt collection management system. OFF. OF INSPECTOR GEN., 
U.S. DEP’T. OF EDUC., ED-OIG/A04N004, REVIEW OF DEBT COLLECTION SYSTEM 2 (DMCS2) 
IMPLEMENTATION (2015). 
69. Maximus Contract, supra note 43, at 230 (amendment modification No. 0032, Jan. 6, 2016). 
For a discussion of problems with Maximus at the Department and other agencies, see infra Part III. 
70. Id. at 233. 
71. Id. 
72. PCA HANDBOOK, supra note 23, 81–118 (covering garnishment); id. at 160–64 (covering 
treasury offset). 
73. Id. at 100.  
74. Id. at 98. 
75. 34 C.F.R. § 682.410(b)(9)(i)(T) (2020); see also Loan Servicing and Collection - Frequently 
Asked Questions, supra note 41, at LR-Q9, https://ifap.ed.gov/loan-servicing-and-collection-
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C. Hearing Officials 
Despite extensive private contractor involvement in administering hearings, it 
does not appear that Maximus or other private contractor employees serve as 
hearing officers for Department-held loans. Further, it is not clear who does. 
For Direct Loans, the hearing officer may be any “qualified employee” of the 
Department whom the Department designates.76 The Department does not provide 
a definition of “qualified employee” and does not explicitly state that the hearing 
officer must be independent or neutral. The Department’s collection agency 
handbook states that hearing officials are Department employees and contracted 
employees that serve as impartial adjudicators.77 For FFEL hearings, the 
Department prohibits collection personnel from conducting hearings and requires 
that hearing officers must be independent not only of the guarantor but also of  
the collector.78  
The private companies responding to the industry survey reported hiring 
private attorneys in most cases to conduct FFEL loan hearings.79 A large state-based 
nonprofit guaranty agency said they use two independent attorneys to conduct 
hearings.80 A small state-based nonprofit said they use one unaffiliated attorney. 
The private servicer stated that it used an individual attorney who is an 
administrative law judge.81 A midsized state agency uses hearing officers from the 
state Attorney General Division of Administrative Hearings. 82 
D. Barriers to Raising Substantive Claims and the “Hardship Only” Focus 
Borrowers may raise a claim of hardship through the hearing process. A 
hardship claim is distinct from substantive claims and defenses in that successful 
hardship claims lead to temporary suspensions or reductions of the amounts seized. 
Even if a borrower is successful in a hardship claim, the debt survives and the 
borrower remains in default. The Department usually reviews these decisions every 
six months and reinstates collection if the borrower can no longer prove hardship.83 
Hardship claims are easier in most cases for the government to consider in response 
to a request for hearing since these claims involve individualized financial 
evaluations rather than legal analysis of eligibility criteria or other issues related to 
substantive claims and defenses. Presumably, this is a key explanation for why the 
Department and its contractors often steer borrowers into “simple” hardship cases, 
 
frequently-asked-questions#LR-Q9 [https://perma.cc/HCG8-JHXM] (stating that private collection 
employees “do not have authority to start or stop wage garnishments”). 
76. 34 C.F.R. § 34.13(a)(2) (2020). 
77. PCA HANDBOOK, supra note 23, at 82. 
78. 34 C.F.R. § 682.410(b)(9)(I). 




83. LOONIN, SHAFROTH & YU, supra note 6, § 9.3.2.3.4. 
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ignoring or rejecting substantive claims that challenge debt enforceability and 
related claims.  
The private servicer/collector in our survey, for example, stated that the 
administrative law judge they employ for hearings only considers matters relating to 
garnishment, which they defined as evaluating whether the loan is eligible for wage 
garnishment and at what percentage.84 An evaluation of the rate of garnishment is 
the same as a hardship determination because it involves considering the borrower’s 
financial situation and then determining if the rate should be reduced or if 
garnishment should be temporarily suspended in cases of severe hardship. Hardship 
decisions are temporary decisions that are reviewed usually every six months.85 This 
is a far cry from the comprehensive relief available through a successful discharge 
claim where the debt is eliminated. 
Student loan counselors and advocates often perpetuate this inaccurate view 
of the hearing process as merely a financial evaluation. For example, one media 
account described a student loan hearing as “no more than a long form detailing 
your income, debt and expenses. The goal is to stop or reduce garnishment.”86 The 
article quoted a student loan counselor explaining that “You hear the word ‘hearing’ 
and think, ‘Oh my god, I need an attorney!’ But it’s just a basic exchange  
of information.”87 
The experiences of one of the original Corinthian debt strikers illustrates 
problems with the “hardship or nothing” hearing approach.88 This borrower was 
among the first to file a borrower defense claim in 2014. As collection continued, 
she filed multiple requests for a hearing to challenge wage garnishment, but she 
never got a hearing.89 The letter she received from the collection agency handling 
 
84. Industry Survey, supra note 42. 
85. LOONIN, SHAFROTH & YU, supra note 6, § 9.3.2.3.4. 
86. Kelsey Sheehy, Student Loan Wage Garnishment: How Default Can Gut Your Paycheck, 
NERDWALLET (Aug. 24, 2020), https://www.nerdwallet.com/article/loans/student-loans/wage-
garnishment-student-loan-default [https://perma.cc/EGK5-W76W]. 
87. Id. 
88. The Corinthian debt strikers organized through the Debt Collective, a membership 
organization offering services to empower people to dispute debts. See Michael Stratford, Corinthian 
‘Debt Strike,’ INSIDE HIGHER ED (Feb. 24, 2015), https://www.insidehighered.com/news/2015/02 
/24/student-activists-call-%E2%80%98debt-strike%E2%80%99-against-federal-loans-they-incurred-
embattled [https://perma.cc/K5GU-HFFU] (sharing that Debt Collective stated that it was protesting 
the Department of Education’s support for Corinthian’s “predatory empire” that “pushed hundreds of 
thousands into a debt trap”). See generally DEBT COLLECTIVE, https://debtcollective.org/ 
[https://perma.cc/LE2N-FUAM] ( last visited Oct. 3, 2020). 
89. The Debt Collective detailed the experiences of this borrower, Jessica Madison, in a March 
31, 2019 letter to the House Education and Labor Committee. Letter from Thomas Gokey, Co-Founder 
and Organizer, Debt Collective, and Ann Larson, Co-Founder and Dir., Debt Collective, to Claire Viall 
and Kathy Valle, Educ. & Lab. Comm., U.S. House of Reps. (Mar. 31, 2019) [hereinafter 2019 Debt 
Collective Letter] (on file with author). For further descriptions of Ms. Madison’s fight for borrower 
defense relief, see Danielle Douglas-Gabriel, Trump Changes Higher Ed with Rollback of Obama-Era 
Consumer Protections, WASH. POST (July 9, 2017), https://www.washingtonpost.com/local/education/ 
trump-changes-higher-ed-with-rollback-of-obama-era-consumer-protections/2017/07/09/89acd78a-
59e3-11e7-9b7d-14576dc0f39d_story.html [https://perma.cc/9U4T-H9M8]; Vimal Patel, Look Who’s 
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the account showed that the agency either did not read or understand the request 
because they asserted she was requesting a hardship reduction or suspension when, 
in fact, she raised a substantive defense of unenforceability.90 By January 2017, the 
Department approved the borrower defense application, but shockingly, the 
garnishments continued.91 The garnishment only stopped months later when a 
journalist contacted the Department and the collection agency about this specific 
case. Two days later, the garnishment stopped.92  
In a 2012 decision, a borrower requested a hearing, but the Department 
mistakenly scheduled the hearing for a borrower with a different name.93 Because 
the borrower with the last name of Topping could not provide identification for a 
borrower named “Toppina,” he was prohibited from participating in the hearing.94 
The borrower subsequently contacted his congresswoman and together they 
requested an explanation from the Department.95 The borrower then received a 
garnishment hearing decision stating that he did not have a financial hardship.96 
This decision ignored that he was raising a substantive defense, not hardship. 
Eventually the Department official admitted the hearing was held for the wrong 
reason and withdrew the garnishment order.97  
This practice of steering borrowers into hardship is likely related at least in 
part to confusion over whether the hearing officials should or can make decisions 
on substantive defenses, including requests for loan discharges. On one hand, the 
Department has stated that hearing officials are responsible for evaluating discharge 
and other loan enforceability claims. For example, in 2013, the Department stated 
specifically that if a borrower raises enforceability in a hearing, it is clear that the 
hearing official must determine whether the debt in question is enforceable and if 
so, in what amount.98 The Department described this as more than a  
bookkeeping test.99  
The request for hearing forms clearly include boxes to check for substantive 
defenses including claims related to statutory discharges such as closed school and 
disability.100 In response to litigation in 2018, the Department even changed the 
 
Talking About Cancelling Debt: How a Fringe Idea Went Mainstream, CHRON. HIGHER EDUC., Jan. 23, 
2020, at A8. 
90. 2019 Debt Collective Letter, supra note 89.  
91. Id. 
92. Id. This borrower, Jessica Madison, eventually suffered serious health issues and died in 
October 2019. Patel, supra note 89.  
93. Topping v. U.S. Dep’t of Educ., No. 2:09-CV-396-FTM-29, 2012 WL 397809  





98. Student Assistance General Provisions, 78 Fed. Reg. 65768, 65782 (Nov. 1, 2013) (to be 
codified at 34 C.F.R. pts. 668, 674, 682, 685). 
99. Id. 
100. See supra note 38. 
First to Printer_Loonin_TW Edits.docx (Do Not Delete) 10/26/20  2:01 PM 
2020] ILLUSORY DUE PROCESS 187 
offset notice and request for hearing forms to include a specific reference to 
borrower defenses.101 The prior forms simply provided a space for borrowers to 
check and explain an assertion that the loan was not enforceable.102 In contrast, the 
revised form provides a separate space for a borrower to check and explain a 
defense to repayment of a debt, also known as a borrower defense, which is an 
assertion that the loan is void or unenforceable because of school misconduct.103 
On the other hand, the Department has stated that hearing officials are not 
qualified to evaluate at least some substantive claims, including critical claims about 
loan enforceability. During litigation in 2017, a Department official serving as the 
Supervisory Program and Management Analyst in the Department’s Hearings and 
Interagency Appeals Branch (a subpart of Federal Student Aid, or FSA), testified 
that her department “does not, nor does it possess the necessary qualifications or 
authority to, review the merits of borrower defense claims submitted  
by borrowers.”104  
Similarly, one of the companies in the industry survey acknowledged that it 
handles substantive discharge defenses by terminating the garnishment process and 
passing the application to the regular “discharge regulatory process.”105 The agency 
does not expect hearing officers to evaluate these substantive claims  
and defenses.106 
The other companies responding to the industry survey provided conflicting 
information about handling substantive defenses and discharges.107 Although 
difficult to believe, one stated that a borrower has never raised a discharge issue on 
a hearing form.108 Another said that if a borrower raises discharge, the agency 
ombudsman reviews and determines eligibility, and if eligibility is found, the 
discharge is processed.109 This is distinct from the hearing process. The large 
nonprofit agency said that if the borrower has not previously raised the objection, 
the borrower is provided an application (if applicable) to provide other supporting 
documentation to determine enforceability.110 The documentation is reviewed prior 
 
101. Defendant’s Status Report at 2, Williams v. DeVos, No. CV 16-11949-LTS, 2019 
WL7592345 (D. Mass. Aug. 8, 2019), ECF No. 101. 
102. See Letter from John S. Brooks, Acting Dir., Default Div., Fed. Student Aid, U.S. Dep’t of 
Educ., to Treasury Offset Coordinator ( June 27, 2016), https://library.nclc.org/sites/default/files/ 
TOP-pkg.pdf [https://perma.cc/Z7UR-YLFF] (enclosing an “Addendum to the Agreement Pursuant 
to Section 428(b) of the Higher Education Act of 1965, as amended, with a State or Private Non-profit 
Institution or Organization for Coverage of Its Student Loan Insurance Program under the Interest 
Benefits Provision of Section 428(a) of the Act,” including a “Request for Review” form as  
Attachment E). 
103. Defendant’s Status Report, supra note 101, at Exhibit D. 
104. Declaration of Myra Tyler at 8, Dieffenbacher v. DeVos, No. 17-cv-00342 (C.D. Cal. May 
22, 2017), ECF No. 27-1.  
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to scheduling a hearing.111 If the borrower’s defense is determined to be valid, 
garnishment activity is stopped and no hearing is scheduled.112 If the documentation 
does not support the borrower’s claim, a hearing is scheduled.  
E. The Overall Broken Hearing Experience 
The student loan collection hearing system is broken in several ways. One 
major problem is the Department’s failure to consider evidence borrowers submit. 
It does not appear to matter if the borrower checks the box for discharge or 
provides extensive supporting documentation. The borrower may send extensive 
evidence to back up the defense only to find in many cases that the government 
does not bother to read the enclosed evidence or claims not to have received it. In 
other cases, the government pretends that it held a hearing and issues a decision 
that has nothing to do with the defense raised. Another barrier is the Department’s 
ignoring requests for oral hearings and simply issuing written decisions.  
In one case, for example, a borrower requested a hearing in response to a 
garnishment notice.113 She was eventually able to get a hearing with a judge who 
told her that the purpose of the hearing was just to inform her of the wage 
garnishment amount and the date it would start.114 The agency did not have copies 
of the original documents to prove the existence of the debt and default.115 The 
judge said he would abstain from making a decision and would give the agency time 
to figure out what had happened. Instead, about a month later, the judge rendered 
decision in favor of garnishment without reconvening the hearing.116  
In another case, a for-profit school borrower objected to garnishment by 
asserting a borrower defense on the grounds of school fraud and other legal 
violations, supported by hundreds of pages of exhibits and legal argument.117 
Despite requesting an in-person hearing, she received a “hearing decision” a 
few weeks later, which simply stated,  
Your client objected that she believe [sic] that her loans are not an 
enforceable debts [sic]. . . . ECMC explained to you and your client why 
these loans were enforceable and they had addressed your concerns and 
enclosed copy of the borrower’s promissory notes. Because ECMC holds 
the promissory note(s) and other and other [sic] records supporting the 
existence of this debt, the borrower has the burden to prove that the debt 
is not owed. . . . [T]he Department finds that the borrower [sic] student 
 
111. Id. 
112. Id.  
113. Mark Kantrowitz, The Horrors of Defaulting on Education Debt, FASTWEB (May 28, 2015), 
https://www.fastweb.com/financial-aid/articles/the-horrors-of-defaulting-on-education-debt [https:// 
perma.cc/2RL9-WLBR].  
114. Id.  
115. Id. 
116. Id.  
117. Complaint, Dieffenbacher v. DeVos, No. 17-cv-00342 (C.D. Cal. Feb. 23, 2017). 
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loan debt is still legally enforceable; therefore the borrower objection  
is denied.118 
The Department halted garnishment only after the borrower filed a federal 
lawsuit and sought a temporary restraining order.119 After two years of litigation, the 
Department managed to evade judgment on the sufficiency of its process and the 
merits of the borrower defense when the borrower filed for personal bankruptcy.120 
Unprompted, the Department offered to discharge her loans under the “undue 
hardship” provision.121 
In practice, the more information a borrower provides to support substantive 
claims and defenses, the more likely it is that the loan holder will not know what to 
do with the information or will lose it. For example, in one recent case with a 
borrower represented by Project on Predatory Student Lending attorneys in Boston, 
a client and former predatory school student raised unenforceability as a defense to 
both garnishment and offset. A nameless hearing official (or officials) issued a 
decision on garnishment and offset within a few weeks of each other. In both cases, 
the borrower and her attorneys sent a cover letter requesting a hearing, a request 
for hearing form signed by the client, and a copy of the borrower defense 
application with extensive evidence. Even though the client separately submitted a 
borrower defense application to the Department, the nameless hearing official 
“evaluating” the garnishment request for hearing stated that the agency had not 
received notification that this application had been submitted. Contrary to prior 
Department instructions, the official also stated that all borrower defense 
applications must be submitted in paper format. In contrast, the nameless hearing 
official signing the offset decision stated that the agency had received the borrower 
defense application and sent it to the Department for processing and in the 
meantime, the official denied the request to stop offset because the borrower did 
not object in a timely fashion. The borrower sent the same exact information in 
both cases and received completely contradictory results.  
Despite the breakdown of this system, the Department continues to present 
administrative hearings as a way for borrowers to access relief. For example, in 
February 2020, the Department announced a new forgery discharge form and 
process intended to help borrowers raise defenses to repayment by disputing the 
authenticity of their signatures on loan agreements.122 The Department explained 
that borrowers have the right to present this evidence in court or in an 
administrative proceeding seeking to enforce the debt, such garnishment or 
 
118. Id.  
119. For more on the Dieffenbacher v. DeVos case, see Dieffenbacher v. DeVos, PROJECT ON 
PREDATORY STUDENT LENDING, https://predatorystudentlending.org/cases/dieffenbacher-v-devos/ 
[https://perma.cc/WJ94-GYWL] ( last visited Oct. 3, 2020). 
120. Id. 
121. Id. 
122. Letter from Fed. Student Aid, U.S. Dep’t of Educ., New Form for Forgery Loan Discharge 
Process for ED-Held Loans (Feb. 12, 2020), https://ifap.ed.gov/electronic-announcements/021220 
form4forgeryloandischargeprocess4edheldloans [https://perma.cc/W3HD-ZZXD]. 
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Treasury offset.123 Presumably this is a reference to the broken student loan 
collection hearing process.  
In other examples, some lawmakers and advocates are calling for a formal 
appeals process when the Department improperly denies rights such as public 
service loan forgiveness.124 Here too, calling for a broken process as a solution to 
remedy improper and inaccurate denials of borrower rights is highly problematic 
and in any case not going to work. It is a recipe for failure if, as described above, 
borrowers attempt to utilize the system and find out that it is largely illusory. 
III. THE RISKS OF PRIVATE OUTSOURCING AND THE INHERENTLY 
GOVERNMENTAL FUNCTION DOCTRINE 
Agency capture and revolving door problems exist in nearly every government 
agency, but they can be particularly acute in the world of federal student loans given 
the complexity of the programs and the close working relationship between the 
Department and its contractors.125 In a revealing 2013 email exchange on a debt 
collection industry web forum, one participant discussing how to enter the 
government student loan debt collection market stated that “[g]etting student loans 
on contingency takes political connections, period.”126 Another added, “You have to 
be a huge player in the game and have some type of connection to even get a piece 
of the pie from government backed loans.”127  
It should not be a surprise that the same well-connected companies keep 
winning government contract competitions. These entrenched companies also tend 
to exploit every possible appeal and protest avenue if their business is threatened, 




124. See, e.g., Stacy Cowley, The Student Loan Appeal Process the Government Doesn’t Tell You 
About, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 17, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com/2020/02/17/business/federal-
student-loan-appeals.html [https://perma.cc/4WKQ-9FE9]. 
125. See generally Martha Graybow, “Revolving Door” Eyed in Student Loan Scandal, 
BOSTON.COM (Apr. 19, 2007), http://archive.boston.com/news/education/higher/articles/2007/04/ 
19/revolving_door_eyed_in_student_loan_scandal/?rss_id=Boston.com+%252F+News [https:// 
perma.cc/467Q-9D4U]; Deanne Loonin & Julie Morgan, Federal Student Aid: Can We Solve a Problem 
We Do Not Understand?, 2018 Utah L. Rev. 897, 906–07 (2018). In their article, Loonin and Morgan 
explain that “agency capture” refers to the phenomenon of government agencies becoming susceptible 
to the influence and control of the corporate entities they are meant to regulate. The “revolving door” 
refers to the pattern of employees of regulated entities moving back and forth between public and private 
sector employment. 
126. AmeripayC, Comment to Looking to Move into Student Loan Collections, INSIDE ARM  
(Aug. 30, 2013, 8:36 AM), http://www.insidearm.com/forum/topic/looking-to-move-into-student-
loan-collections/#post-130384 [https://perma.cc/FKD7-FGGA].  
127. Id. 
128. Colleen Campbell, The Long Path to a New Student Loan Repayment System, CTR. FOR  
AM. PROGRESS (Sept. 10, 2019, 5:00 AM), https://www.americanprogress.org/issues/education-
postsecondary/news/2019/09/10/474254/long-path-new-student-loan-repayment-system/ [https:// 
perma.cc/3Q7X-MP4W]. 
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In the hearing area, the Department appears to rely heavily on Maximus for 
hearing administration and related tasks.129 This is a company that has a long track 
record of problems and sanctions related to federal and state contracts, mostly in 
the welfare and health benefits fields.130 Beneficiary complaints are ubiquitous.131 
In a December 2019 report, the Government Contractor Accountability Project 
described a litany of serious problems with Maximus’s administration of Medicaid 
programs across the country.132 Among other problems at the Department of 
Education, Maximus was the debt management contractor in 2019 during a 
prolonged period of serious call center communication breakdowns.133 
Though Maximus generally operates under the public radar, as of September 
2017 it had nearly $2.5 billion in annual revenue and 20,400 employees around the 
world.134 As one expert wrote, the company is so enmeshed in government public 
benefits programs that “they are almost becoming government.”135 
The inherently governmental function doctrine was developed to reduce or 
eliminate the risks of hiring private actors, such as Maximus, to administer and 
control key government functions.136 As courts have noted, “the basic concept of 
democratic rule . . . is compromised when public powers are abandoned to those 
who are neither elected by the people, appointed by a public official or entity, nor 
employed by the government.”137 Private corporations exist primarily to maximize 
profits. When a corporation makes eligibility and related decisions for government 
programs, it is very difficult to safeguard against self-interest or conflicts of interest 
on the part of the corporation.138 These are serious concerns given the long history 
 
129. See supra Section II.B. 
130. McMillan, supra note 66. 
131. Dru Stevenson, Privatization of Welfare Services: Delegation by Contract, 45  
ARIZ. L. REV. 83, 108 (2003). 
132. GOV’T CONTRACTOR ACCOUNTABILITY PROJECT, MAXIMUM HARM: MAXIMUS’S 
MEDICAID MANAGEMENT FAILURES (2019), https://www.maximusaccountability.org/system/files/ 
2019.11.07_maximumharmreport.pdf [https://perma.cc/X8M5-6F8F]; see also Becky Z. Dernbach, 
This Is What Happens When You Let a For-Profit Company Run Public Benefits, MOTHER JONES  
(Dec. 16, 2019), https://www.motherjones.com/politics/2019/12/this-is-what-happens-when-you-
let-a-for-profit-company-run-public-benefits/ [https://perma.cc/9B9Y-8DMD]; John Lasker, Special 
Report - Profitus Maximus, PULSE (Mar. 14, 2013), https://www.chattanoogapulse.com/features/ 
profitus-maximus/ [https://perma.cc/5C2N-VC4U]; Jonas Persson & Mary Bottari, Privatization  
Fail: The Troubled History of Maximus Inc., PR WATCH (Oct. 24, 2014, 9:36 AM), https:// 
www.prwatch.org/news/2014/10/12638/privatization-fail-troubled-history-maximus-inc [https:// 
perma.cc/4E4E-SS8N].  
133. Danielle Douglas-Gabriel, Staffing Shortage at Education Department’s Loan Default Unit 
Frustrates Struggling Borrowers, WASH. POST (Mar. 21, 2019, 11:01 AM), https://www.washington 
post.com/education/2019/03/21/staffing-shortage-education-departments-loan-default-units-frustrates- 
struggling-borrowers/ [https://perma.cc/N8SG-DE37]. 
134. McMillan, supra note 66. 
135. Id.  
136. See generally Thomas J. Laubacher, Simplifying Inherently Governmental Functions: Creating a 
Principled Approach from Its Ad Hoc Beginnings, 46 PUB. CONT. L.J. 791 (2017). 
137. Tex. Boll Weevil Eradication Found. v. Lewellen, 952 S.W.2d 454, 469 (Tex. 1997). 
138. Stevenson, supra note 131, at 103–04.  
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in the United States of government partnerships with the private sector where the 
government enabled or ignored private sector practices that promoted 
discrimination and other illegal activities.139 
All three branches of the government have refined the definition of inherently 
governmental functions over time, including in the 1998 Federal Activities 
Inventory Reform Act (FAIR Act).140 In 2011, the Obama administration 
established two tests for identifying these functions.141 The first examines the nature 
of the function.142 Under this test, functions that involve the exercise of sovereign 
powers are inherently governmental.143 The policy letter describing these tests listed 
the functions meeting the definition, including representing the United States in an 
intergovernmental forum or body.144 The second test examines the exercise of 
discretion in the function: “‘[I]f the exercise of . . . discretion commits the 
government to a course of action where two or more alternative courses of action 
exist,’ it is inherently governmental unless the decision-making is guided by specific 
ranges of acceptable discretion and is subject to meaningful oversight or final 
approval by agency officials.”145 The letter does not establish what should be done 
if an agency violates the requirement not to contract out these functions.146 
Acting as a decision maker in a student loan collection hearing should meet 
one or both of these tests. A hearing officer is exercising discretion that commits 
the government not only to reductions in amounts collected but also binds the 
government to comprehensive relief options such as discharges. In general, deciding 
cases involves discretion when weighing evidence and applying the law. Hearing 
officials are deciding, among other issues, how government resources should be 
utilized. Although not a full judicial trial, these hearings should provide borrowers 
with substantial due process rights related to presentations of evidence, processes 
to request documents, standards for allowable claims and defenses, and burdens of 
proof.147  
There is substantial precedent that judicial and quasi-judicial functions such as 
administrative hearings fit within the inherently governmental function category. 
 
139. See generally KEEANGA-YAMAHTTA TAYLOR, RACE FOR PROFIT: HOW BANKS AND THE 
REAL ESTATE INDUSTRY UNDERMINED BLACK HOMEOWNERSHIP (2019).  
140. Federal Activities Inventory Reform Act of 1998, Pub. L. No. 105-270, § 5(2)(A), 112  
Stat. 2382, 2384 (codified at 31 U.S.C. § 501). 
141. Office of Federal Procurement Policy (OFPP) Policy Letter 11-01, Performance of 
Inherently Governmental and Critical Functions, 76 Fed. Reg. 56,227 (Sept. 12, 2011).  
142. Laubacher, supra note 136, at 811. 
143. Office of Federal Procurement Policy (OFPP) Policy Letter 11-01, 76 Fed. Reg. at 56, 227. 
144. Id.  
145. Laubacher, supra note 136, at 811 (quoting Office of Federal Procurement Policy (OFPP) 
Policy Letter 11-01, 76 Fed. Reg. at 56,237). 
146. Office of Federal Procurement Policy (OFPP) Policy Letter 11-01, 76 Fed. Reg. at 56, 240 
(explaining that agencies shall develop and maintain internal procedures to address the requirements of 
this guidance, and those procedures shall be reviewed by agency management no less than every  
two years). 
147. See supra Part IV. 
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For example, in a 2000 ruling, a court drew a distinction between delegations of 
rulemaking authority to the private sector, which affect a general class, and 
delegations of adjudicative power, which determine the rights of an individual.148 
The former is more likely to survive judicial scrutiny when, for example, a legislature 
gives authority to voters to make rules through public referendums.149 In contrast, 
according to the court, transferring judicial type decision-making “is what the Due 
Process Clause prohibits.”150  
Preliminary hearing activities, such as reviewing requests for hearings and 
transferring requests within the agency, are arguably also inherently governmental 
functions. In practice, nearly every aspect of the hearing process requires the type 
of discretion that should not be left to the private sector. Drafting a garnishment 
hearing response, for example, requires discretion regarding which claims to 
consider and the substance of the response. This is similar to the arguments for 
classifying administration of FOIA requests as inherently governmental 
functions.151 The steps involved in both areas are not easily divided into roles that 
require judgment and discretion and those that do not. The best course of action to 
ensure integrity of the process is to err on the side of prohibiting private  
company involvement.  
Whether these preliminary hearing functions are considered inherently 
governmental may depend on the scope of discretion and the level of oversight. 
Courts considering how to draw these lines generally ask if the private delegate’s 
actions are subject to meaningful review by a government agency.152 It is not clear 
how much review would be sufficient to allow private outsourcing, especially since 
government oversight of private contractors, including at the Department, has 
historically been weak.153 Further, if the purpose of the inherently governmental 
function doctrine is to require that these functions be completed by federal 
employees, the mere possibility of oversight does not satisfy that purpose.154 Among 
other issues, this also leads to the question of why the government should outsource 
key functions if doing so tends to exacerbate existing problems and creates a need 
for even more oversight.155 A GAO associate director testified in 1998 that when 
the governmental role in the delivery of services is reduced through privatization, 
 
148. Stevenson, supra note 131, at 99 (discussing Club Misty, Inc. v. Laski, 208 F.3d 615 (7th 
Cir. 2000)).  
149. Id. 
150. Club Misty, Inc., 208 F.3d at 622. 
151. Tiffany A. Stedman, Outsourcing Openness: Problems with the Private Processing of Freedom 
of Information Act Requests, 35 PUB. CONT. L.J. 133, 148–49 (2005). 
152. See, e.g., Tex. Boll Weevil Eradication Found. v. Lewellen, 952 S.W.2d 454 (Tex. 1997) 
(reviewing nondelegation doctrine and sets out an eight-part test). 
153. See Laubacher, supra note 136, at 818 (arguing that despite discussion of problems with lack 
of oversight of federal procurements, improvements have not happened). 
154. Stedman, supra note 151, at 149. 
155. Id. at 152. 
First to Printer_Loonin_TW Edits.docx (Do Not Delete) 10/26/20  2:01 PM 
194 UC IRVINE LAW REVIEW [Vol. 11:173 
the need for aggressive monitoring and oversight grows.156 Further, oversight is 
necessary to evaluate compliance with the terms of the privatization agreement and 
in delivering the goods and services.157 
Despite the persuasive authority that hearing administrations should be 
inherently government functions, it does not appear that the Department has 
formally made this classification. The FAIR Act required agencies to create a list of 
activities performed by the agency that are not inherently governmental and submit 
that list to the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) and to the public.158 As 
of early 2020, the latest FAIR inventory on the Department’s website was from 
2017.159 This outdated inventory describes a general “collection” category classified 
as closely associated with inherently governmental functions.160 The “closely 
associated” category is derived from the Obama administration 2011 policy memo 
which differentiated among functions closely associated with inherently 
governmental function (thus outsourceable in specific situations) and critical 
functions that must be performed by government employees.161  
In response to a request for clarification, the designated Department official 
stated that the inventory is outdated because the Department had not yet received 
approval from the Office of Management and Budget to post the 2018 FAIR Act 
report.162 In response to the question of whether the Department classifies jobs 
related to collection hearings as inherently governmental functions, the official said 
that “it is difficult to answer your question accurately” because “there doesn’t 
appear to be any categories to determine which jobs are related to administrative 
collection hearings.”163  
 
156. Id. (citing Competition for Commercial Activities in the Federal Government: Hearing Before 
the Subcomm. on Oversight of Gov’t Mgmt. Restructuring & the Dist. of Columbia, 105th Cong. (1998) 
(statement of J. Christopher Mihm, Acting Associate Director, Federal Management Workforce Issues, 
U.S. General Accounting Office)). 
157. Id.  
158. Federal Activities Inventory Reform Act of 1998, Pub. L. No. 105-270, § 2(a)-(c)(1), 112 
Stat. 2382 (codified at 31 U.S.C. § 501).  
159. U.S. Dep’t of Education FAIR Act Inventory, U.S. DEP’T OF EDUC., https://www2.ed.gov/ 
about/offices/list/ocfo/fair-act-inventory/index.html [https://perma.cc/Q5ET-Q6WU] ( last visited 
Oct. 3, 2020).  
160. Id.  
161. Office of Federal Procurement Policy (OFPP) Policy Letter 11-01, 76 Fed. Reg. at 56,238 
(stating that agencies subject to the FAIR Act must give special consideration to using federal employees 
to perform functions closely associated with inherently governmental functions).  
162. E-mail from Vito Pietanza, Contracts Acquisition Innovation Advocate, U.S. Dep’t of 
Educ., to the author ( Jan. 21, 2020) (on file with author). Mr. Pietanza is listed on the Department’s 
FAIR Act Inventory website as the contact for questions. See U.S. Department of Education FAIR Act 
Inventory, supra note 159.  
163. E-mail from Vito Pietanza, supra note 162. 
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IV. LACK OF GOVERNMENT ACCOUNTABILITY AND BORROWER DUE PROCESS 
RIGHTS 
The risks arising from privatization should not obscure the dismal public 
record of oversight in the federal student aid program. There is a long and 
unfortunate history of bureaucratic failures at the Department of Education.164 The 
Department too often abdicates its duty to borrowers in order to cut costs or serve 
other constituencies, including private companies that lobby heavily for access and 
profitable contracts.165 These problems stem from the conflict of interest inherent 
in the current structure of federal aid where the government is both the lender, 
school participation gatekeeper, and collector.166 This is fueled by corruption, 
including a revolving door of industry interests in the government and other 
policymaking circles.167  
These concerns can be addressed in part through both expanded public and 
private oversight and enforcement of borrower rights, but a key problem is the lack 
of hearing-specific oversight requirements. For FFEL loans, the agreements 
guaranty agencies must sign to participate in the treasury offset program require the 
agencies to submit a final offset evaluation report to the Department and provide 
the Department with a sample of responses to borrower objections to offset for 
one percent of the cases.168 In addition, guaranty agencies are supposed to provide 
the Department with the nature, total number, and disposition of borrower 
objections.169 It is not clear if this is done and if so, whether the information is 
public, but it should be.  
Historically lax federal government oversight underscores the importance of 
state and private enforcement actions. Constitutional due process cases should be a 
centerpiece of these enforcement actions, building on the fair hearing rights the 
Supreme Court set out in Goldberg v. Kelly and progeny.  
The Supreme Court held in Goldberg v. Kelly that due process protections 
applied to welfare benefits because those benefits were a matter of statutory 
entitlement and that hearings must occur before termination of benefits.170 The 
 
164. See, e.g., Cory Turner, Federal Watchdog Issues Scathing Report on Ed Department’s Handling 




166. Loonin & Morgan, supra note 125, at 911. 
167. JULIE MARGETTA MORGAN, ROOSEVELT INST., WHO PAYS? HOW INDUSTRY INSIDERS 
RIG THE STUDENT LOAN SYSTEM—AND HOW TO STOP IT ( 2018), https://rooseveltinstitute.org/ 
wp-content/uploads/2020/07/RI-Who-Pays-Insiders-Rig-Student-Loan-System-201806.pdf [https:// 
perma.cc/37RQ-NBXD].  
168. Letter from John S. Brooks, supra note 102, at app. I § 7.4. Earlier versions of these 
agreements are available online. Guaranty Agency, MYEDDEBT.ED.GOV, https://myeddebt.ed.gov/ 
partner/partnerGASupportTOPMenu.action [https://perma.cc/K92N-WJXC] ( last visited  
Oct. 3, 2020). 
169. Id. 
170. Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 261 (1970). 
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Court went on to spell out essential features for hearings, including provision of 
timely and adequate notice, a chance to argue the case orally, and full notice of 
decisions in writing.171 The influence of this decision carried beyond welfare to 
other government benefits programs.172 Six years after Goldberg, the Supreme Court 
set out a balancing test in Mathews v. Eldrige to determine what type of process is 
due in these cases.173 
Despite the strong protections set out in Goldberg and subsequent cases, 
student loan borrowers have been mostly unsuccessful in challenging student loan 
collection hearings on constitutional due process grounds.174 Courts have held that 
borrowers just need an opportunity to be heard before a neutral decision maker but 
have not expressed much about how meaningful that opportunity should be.175 In 
one case, the court stated that the individual’s need for the portion of his wages 
subject to garnishment did not approach the public interest at stake in Goldberg  
v. Kelly.176  
Courts have also upheld the Department’s process of conducting garnishment 
hearings mostly in writing rather than orally or in person, expressing sympathy with 
the pressure of dealing with the large volume of annual actions.177 Even cases 
challenging the neutrality of the arbiter have sided with the government.178 In at 
least a few cases, the Department has chosen to change practices, such as notice 
provisions, going forward even though the borrower’s challenge on due process 
grounds failed.179 
Nonetheless, beyond due process claims, borrowers may bring other claims 
against state actors that are not available against private entities. This includes  
 
171. Id. at 267–69.  
172. Jason Parkin, Adaptable Due Process, 160 U. PA. L. REV. 1309, 1325 (2012).  
173. Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 335 (1976). The test includes three factors: First, the 
private interest that will be affected by the official action; second, the risk of an erroneous deprivation 
of such interest through the procedures used, and the probable value, if any, of additional or substantive 
procedural safeguards; and third, the government’s interest, including the function involved and the 
fiscal and administrative burdens that the additional or substitute procedural requirement would  
entail. Id.  
174. LOONIN, SHAFROTH & YU, supra note 6, § 14.2.6. 
175. Nelson v. Diversified Collection Servs., Inc., 961 F. Supp. 863, 870 (1997). 
176. Id. 
177. Pageus v. U.S. Dep’t of Educ., No. 1:07-cv-03167-JOF, 2010 WL 731590, at *5–6  
(N.D. Ga. Feb. 25, 2010).  
178. Kelly v. Aman Collection Servs., No. 03-6091, 2007 WL 909547, at *11 (D. Minn. Mar. 23, 
2007) (finding that nothing precluded Department of Education from designating an employee as 
hearing official). 
179. LOONIN, SHAFROTH & YU, supra note 6, § 14.4.6.2. Borrowers may also be successful in 
cases where the Department fails to comply with the requirements for properly assigning debts to the 
Department of Treasury for collection. See, e.g., Ibrahim v. United States, 112 Fed. Cl. 333 (2013) 
(denying government’s motion to dismiss plaintiff’s claim that tax offset was illegal and holding that 
Department of Education misapplied section 3720A when it used plaintiff’s refund to satisfy debt of 
another); Kipple v. United States, 102 Fed. Cl. 773 (2012) (denying government’s motion for summary 
judgment because questions remained about whether the school properly assigned student loan note to 
the Department of Education and whether the Department followed DCIA offset procedures). 
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§ 1983, which provides the statutory vehicle for remedying constitutional and 
federal statutory violations committed by state actors.180 The government should 
also be liable for discriminatory practices in administration of the federal student 
loan program under the Equal Credit Opportunity Act and other antidiscrimination 
laws.181 
V. REFORMING THE EXISTING COLLECTION HEARING SYSTEM 
A. Procedural Justice and Transparency 
The goal of reforming the existing student loan collection hearing process is 
to make procedural justice a reality for student loan borrowers. As professor and 
sociologist Rebecca Sandefur writes, “When people perceive that the decision 
process that led to an outcome was fair, incorporated their participation, treated 
them with respect, and was managed by an impartial adjudicator, they experience 
procedural justice.”182  
The first step to achieving procedural fairness is to require transparency about 
hearing volume, outcomes, and borrower experiences. A key argument for the utility 
of administrative hearings is to shine a light on patterns of administrative error.183 
This can only occur if borrowers know about the hearings and are able to access 
them and if the government and contractors provide key outcome information  
and data. 
The FOIA process is one way to get this information, but it too is broken.184 
There are significant drawbacks to the current FOIA process, including that it puts 
the burden on the requester to know what documents or records the government 
has produced or possesses. It is time-consuming and can be expensive.185 Further, 
its exemptions—particularly those for trade secrets and law enforcement—make it 
difficult to retrieve information that pertains to student loan servicing, debt 
collection, and other loan-related activities.186  
 
180. 42 U.S.C. § 1983. 
181 JEREMIAH BATTLE, JR., CREDIT DISCRIMINATION § 2.2.5.6 (Nat’l Consumer L. Center 
ed., 7th ed. 2018). Senator Elizabeth Warren presented a plan to address racial disparities and predatory 
practices in the higher education system as part of her presidential campaign. The plan notes that the 
Department of Education is sitting on evidence of massive racial disparities in administration of the 
student loan program. Elizabeth Warren, My Plan to Cancel Student Loan Debt on Day One of My 
Presidency, WARREN DEMOCRATS, https://elizabethwarren.com/plans/student-loan-debt-day-one 
[https://perma.cc/C7TQ-HKG3] ( last visited Oct. 3, 2020). Private contractors should also be liable 
for violations of anti-discrimination laws.
182. Rebecca L. Sandefur & Thomas M. Clarke, Designing the Competition: A Future of Roles 
Beyond Lawyers? The Case of the USA, 67 HASTINGS L.J. 1467, 1478 (2016). 
183. Lens, supra note 51, at 35. 
184. See generally Loonin & Morgan, supra note 125, at 910–17. 
185. Id. 
186. Id. at 913; see also N.Y. Legal Assistance Grp., Inc. v. U.S. Dep’t of Educ., No. 15 Civ. 3818 
(LGS), 2017 WL 2973976, at *9 (S.D.N.Y. July 12, 2017) (finding that the collection agency handbook 
and certain disability discharge guidelines did not qualify as law enforcement documents under 
Exemption 7(E)). 
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There is a need to reform the FOIA process to shine the light on government 
activities and on private contractor practices as well. Even the government often 
faces roadblocks trying to access information about contractors’ proprietary 
systems, which are owned and maintained by the companies.187 When the 
Department requires information, it must put together a detailed request and, in 
some cases, pay for the extra work the contractor must perform.188 Department 
resources to pursue this information have been limited.189 
In addition to greater transparency about government practices, the 
government must also be more transparent with borrowers by providing 
information about relief programs. The government and its contractors too often 
create barriers to program usage by failing to inform borrowers about relief 
programs and about how to access them.190 In other cases, the government has 
created eligibility standards that are nearly impossible for borrowers to meet.191 
Piven and Cloward’s description of public welfare systems in the ‘60s rings 
disturbingly true today:  
[P]ublic welfare systems try to keep their budgets down and their rolls low 
by failing to inform people of the rights available to them; by intimidating 
and shaming them to the degree that they are reluctant either to apply or 
to press claims, and by arbitrarily denying benefits to those who  
are eligible.192  
 
187. Campbell, supra note 128. 
188. Id. 
189. Id.  
190. See Loonin & Morgan, supra note 125, at 904–05; Danielle Douglas-Gabriel, GAO Study 
Says Confusing Terms of a Temporary Program for Student Loan Forgiveness Resulted in High Denial Rate, 
WASH. POST (Sept. 5, 2019, 11:45 AM), https://www.washingtonpost.com/education/2019/09/05/ 
gao-study-says-confusing-terms-temporary-program-student-loan-forgiveness-resulted-high-denial-
rate/ [https://perma.cc/8LJE-6ZJS ]; Danielle Douglas-Gabriel, Government Gets Tough on Student 
Loan Servicers, But Will It Be Effective?, WASH. POST (July 20, 2016, 2:37 PM), https://www.washington 
post.com/news/grade-point/wp/2016/07/20/government-gets-tough-on-student-loan-servicers-but- 
will-it-be-effective/ [https://perma.cc/BYW4-57VK]. The Department may even build in low 
utilization rates in estimating program costs. For example, in a 2015 article, Department officials 
estimated the cost of loan discharges at the predatory school chain Corinthian based on a low six 
percent discharge program usage rate. Michael Stratford, Corinthian Closes for Good, INSIDE HIGHER 
ED (Apr. 27, 2015), https://www.insidehighered.com/news/2015/04/27/corinthian-ends-operations-
remaining-campuses-affecting-16000-students [https://perma.cc/ANN6-96SG]. 
191. See, e.g., Press Release, The Project on Predatory Student Lending, Student Advocates 
Challenge DeVos’s Borrower Defense Rule (Feb. 19, 2020), https://predatorystudentlending.org/ 
news/press-releases/student-advocates-challenge-devos-borrower-defense-rule-press-release/ [https:// 
perma.cc/CM7S-4BZ8]. Borrowers that do learn about relief options can in some cases 
administratively appeal denials of their applications. This is distinct from the student loan collection 
hearing process discussed in this Article. Only borrowers facing the extraordinarily powerful array of 
government collection powers can use the student loan collection hearing process as a way to raise 
substantive claims and defenses and seek comprehensive relief. These collection hearings are supposed 
to be more like judicial proceedings with a number of mandatory due process requirements. The 
reconsideration right after discharge denials, in contrast, is generally a perfunctory written review. If 
denied at this reconsideration stage, borrowers are entitled to seek formal review in federal court.  
192. Frances Fox Piven & Richard Cloward, The Weight of the Poor: A Strategy to End Poverty, 
NATION (Mar. 8, 2010), https://www.thenation.com/article/archive/weight-poor-strategy-end-
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Challenging agency administrative processes not only expands access to 
individual relief but also may bolster the movement for systemic change discussed 
in Part VII.193  
B. Eliminating the Private Contractor Role and Holding Government Accountable 
One way to eliminate the risks of privatization is to classify all aspects of the 
hearing process as inherently governmental, eliminating the private contractor role 
altogether.194 The Department should do so formally through the FAIR process. If 
the Department fails to do so, Congress must.195 In the past Congress has declared 
certain functions inherently governmental (or not) and removed funding from 
various programs that it felt did not accurately address inherently  
governmental functions.196 
Although it is preferable for government employees to administer all aspects 
of the hearing process, it might be possible for some of these functions to be 
performed privately if there were rigorous government oversight. This is a 
tremendous challenge given the Department’s track record.197  
If private contractors remain in some capacity, the government must make the 
performance metrics public and ensure that the contracts compensate contractors 
for doing the right thing and complying with borrower rights provisions. The 
government should also include third-party beneficiary rights so that borrowers 
could force compliance with the terms of the contracts.198  
Private contractors in these situations must also be liable for abuses and legal 
violations that occur in their hearing-related capacities. In theory, private 
contractors should be liable for claims that government agencies can at times evade 
due to sovereign immunity. However, private contractors often attempt to avoid 
liability by arguing that they have derivative immunity. This is a legal area in some 
flux as the Supreme Court in recent years has hinted at possible immunity for 
contractors.199 Courts and Congress must act to halt this growing movement toward 
private sector immunity and evasion of liability. 
In addition to common law claims and rigorous government oversight, public 
enforcement agencies and individuals bringing private claims should consider other 
claims that are available against private entities that are not available against the 
 
poverty/ [https://perma.cc/3VCM-PWRL] (providing a new introduction to the May 2, 1966 Nation 
article with the same title). 
193. Id. (describing a view that a massive drive to recruit eligible individuals onto public 
assistance rolls would precipitate a financial and political crisis, forcing a federal solution to poverty). 
194. See supra Part IV. 
195. Laubacher, supra note 136, at 813–14. 
196. Id.  
197. See supra Part V. 
198. Michele Estrin Gilman, Legal Accountability in an Era of Privatized Welfare, 89  
CALIF. L. REV. 569, 635 (2001).  
199. See generally Jason Malone, Derivative Immunity: The Impact of Campbell-Ewald  
Co. v. Gomez, 50 CREIGHTON L. REV. 87 (2016). 
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government. This includes consumer protection laws such as the Fair Debt 
Collection Practices Act (FDCPA). The FDCPA exempts government officers or 
employees in the performance of official duties, but a majority of courts have held 
that this exemption does not apply to federal contractors.200  
Eliminating the private contractor role will only be effective if the government 
competently fills the void. As discussed in Part V, this is a tremendous challenge 
given the inherent conflicts of interest at the Department, lax oversight, and 
corruption. Although not the topic of this Article, all proposals to restructure the 
federal aid program to eliminate the conflicts of interest and corruption should be 
on the table, including splitting up units within the Department of Education to 
separate the loan origination, school gatekeeping, and collection roles and/or 
considering enlisting other agencies, such as the Consumer Financial Protection 
Bureau, to assume the consumer protection role.201 
In addition, public and private enforcement agencies and advocates must step 
up and fight to put teeth back into constitutional due process rights for borrowers. 
As discussed in Part V, borrowers have generally been unsuccessful in challenging 
the current hearing process based on constitutional due process claims. This is due 
in part to outdated procedural due process jurisprudence.202 Among other concerns, 
courts developed these doctrines at a time when private contractor involvement in 
the administration of public benefits programs was minimal and, according to some 
scholars, there were fewer incentives to terminate beneficiaries from  
these programs.203  
C. Restructuring the Hearing Process 
The government’s current practice of using Department employees as hearing 
officials must end. These designated officials are employees of the agency that is 
also responsible for collecting funds. This should be considered contrary to the 
 
200. 15 U.S.C. § 1692a (6)(C) (providing exemption for government officers or employees in 
the performance of official duties). For cases on Department of Education federal contractors, see, for 
example, Brannan v. United Student Aid Funds, Inc., 94 F.3d 1260, 1263 (9th Cir. 1996) (holding that 
a guaranty agency is not exempt because it is not a government agency or employee). See also Del Campo 
v. Am. Corrective Counseling Serv., Inc., 718 F. Supp. 2d 1116, 1125 (N.D. Cal. 2010) (holding that 
the 2006 amendment to the FDCPA, which added a narrow exemption for private contractors 
operating bad check diversion programs, did not evince a general intent that private contractors 
operating pretrial diversion programs were never intended to be considered debt collectors); Gradisher 
v. Check Enf’t Unit, 133 F. Supp. 2d 988, 992 (W.D. Mich. 2001) (holding that a private corporation 
hired by a county to collect on dishonored checks does not meet the government actor exemption as 
they are an independent contractor). 
201. See. e.g., Michael Stratford, CFPB Eyes ‘Joint’ Supervision of Student Loan Companies with 
Education Department, POLITICO (Feb. 6, 2020, 6:57 PM), https://subscriber.politicopro.com/ 
article/2020/02/cfpb-eyes-joint-supervision-of-student-loan-companies-with-education-department-
1876051 [https://perma.cc/QP63-Y4J6 ].  
202. See generally Parkin, supra note 172. 
203. Id. at 1339; Lens, supra note 51, at 13 (noting that much has changed about the welfare 
system since Goldberg, including that welfare is no longer considered an entitlement and it is generally 
temporary and work-based). 
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Goldberg court’s holding that an impartial decision maker is essential for fair 
hearings.204 Further, the Department must provide the identities and backgrounds 
of the individuals they hire to act as hearing officials. These reforms will likely 
require new regulations and, in some instances, legislation, although some reforms 
can be implemented through affirmative executive action.  
It is also important to look beyond the existing structure and consider less 
formal paths to justice. Formal hearings, with or without legal representation and 
even with neutral judges, may simply not be optimal for student loan borrowers.  
To test this theory, it is essential to study and evaluate different types of 
adjudicatory programs at other government agencies. This should include an 
evaluation of the role of legal assistance. Legal assistance can make a huge difference 
in hearing outcomes. In immigration hearings, for example, more than eighty 
percent of children who appeared in court unrepresented were deported.205 As 
of 2014, for children who appeared in court with legal representation, only 
twelve percent were deported.206 
Legal representation likely makes a difference for student loan borrowers 
requesting hearings as well. In some cases, a borrower presenting a request with a 
lawyer may persuade an agency to settle or at least drop the collection action.207 If 
the case goes to an actual hearing, the current hearing system makes it particularly 
difficult for borrowers without legal representation to succeed. Even though the 
hearings are not as formal as court trials, they require an ability to navigate a 
confusing system and understand an array of borrower rights. These barriers are 
often greatest for borrowers with language access issues or disabilities.  
In the current framework, the mere presence of a lawyer is likely to lead to a 
better outcome for a borrower. But requiring every person to find a lawyer just to 
make sure courts follow the rules places the responsibility with the wrong party.208 
Further, free and affordable civil legal services are severely underfunded. In a 2017 
survey, the Legal Services Corporation found that about seventy-one percent of 
low-income households had experienced at least one civil legal problem in the 
previous year. Yet there was inadequate or no legal help for eighty-six percent of 
these problems. Those who sought help received only limited or no help more than 
half the time.209 While absolutely worth fighting for, the historical trend is going in 
 
204. Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 271 (1970) (finding that an impartial decision maker is 
essential, but prior involvement in some aspects of a case will not necessarily bar a welfare official from 
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205. Misyrlena Egkolfopoulou, The Thousands of Children Who Go to Immigration Court Alone, 
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207. See Lens, supra note 51, at 48 (suggesting that the mere request for a hearing can act as a 
prod for parties to resolve their own disputes).  
208. Rebecca L. Sandefur, Access to What?, 148 DÆDALUS 49, 52 (2019). 
209. LEGAL SERVS. CORP., THE JUSTICE GAP: MEASURING THE UNMET CIVIL LEGAL NEEDS 
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the opposite direction, toward steadily reduced funding for free and affordable  
legal services.  
Limited legal representation is not necessarily fatal to hopes for procedural 
justice. Professor Rebecca Sandefur and others have written about ways to expand 
forums beyond traditional lawyer-based adversarial hearings, emphasizing that it is 
critical to first clarify the goals of the hearings.210 For student loan hearings, the 
government must first affirm that the goals of the hearings are to increase access 
to justice, not to cut costs or ensure substantial collection rates.  
In looking back at the history of fair hearings for public benefits recipients, 
some have argued that while Goldberg and subsequent decisions brought critical 
procedural rights to many government benefits recipients, courts and policymakers 
may have been too quick to adopt an adversarial hearing model rather than 
experimenting with more investigative or inquisitorial approaches.211 We should 
consider such experiments for student loan borrowers without in any way 
compromising borrower rights. 
The resulting system could be multilayered with informal programs set up to 
resolve straightforward issues, reserving the more formal programs for complex 
issues or other cases that cannot be resolved informally. For example, if a borrower 
is truly seeking only to raise financial hardship as the basis to suspend or reduce 
collection, a neutral, nonprofit counseling or other type of agency could handle and 
make determinations about these individual financial issues. For the system to 
 be effective, there must be robust funding for these services as well as training  
and oversight.  
Some might argue that the current student loan ombudsman office could serve 
this role, but this is not an effective solution to meet procedural justice goals. The 
ombudsman website clearly states that they are not a borrower advocate nor intend 
to replace regular or formal channels of problem resolution within the Department 
or in federal court.212 Most importantly, the ombudsman is based within the 
Department’s Federal Student Aid office, part of the very agency that is not only 
rife with internal conflicts of interest, but also creates most of the problems 
borrowers are seeking to resolve. It is unrealistic to expect the ombudsman to play 
the neutral role required to objectively evaluate borrower hardship and related 
claims or to have any power to affect more positive outcomes for borrowers. 
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In addition to helping evaluate hardship claims, once a borrower requests a 
hearing, there could be a system short of a full hearing to require the government 
to present proof of the borrower’s legal obligation to pay. Without such proof, the 
government would not be able to move forward. This might look like a system in 
New York where creditors are required to provide documentation of the amount 
claimed at the time of filing debt collection lawsuits.213 This was a response to the 
typical situation in which creditors are allowed to file lawsuits without 
documentation of ownership of the debt. The program led to a dramatic drop in 
numbers of debt lawsuits.214 
In an example of a hybrid formal/informal hearing system, the Department 
of Agriculture’s Rural Housing Service (RHS) loan program gives borrowers the 
option to request a complete three-stage review of adverse decisions made by 
agency personnel or servicers.215 The appeal procedures include (1) an informal 
phone conference with the agency staff who made the decision, (2) mediation, and 
(3) an on-the-record in-person hearing before a hearing officer.216  
It may also be preferable to limit the scope of the student loan hearings so that 
the agencies route discharge decisions to specialized units at the Department. The 
officials would stay hearings pending discharge decisions. At least until there is 
widespread reform, this will help ensure that untrained, biased officials are not 
making substantive discharge and related decisions. To make this work effectively, 
there must be discharge decision deadlines created through legislation or regulation 
so that borrowers are not left in limbo for prolonged periods, as is currently  
the case.  
It is also important to seriously consider that informal or alternative prehearing 
procedures may disadvantage low-income individuals.217 This may be particularly 
the case if the informal hearings are mandatory with no way for an individual to 
choose a more formal process or if the informal processes are more like formal 
hearings in disguise.218 This is an area crying out for more study and evaluation.  
VI. SYSTEMIC CHANGE 
“When a system is broken, the solution is systemic reform.” —Rebecca Sandefur219 
There is an open question about how much to prioritize procedural rights to 
achieve a truly just student aid system. Improving process without tackling systemic 
issues is counterproductive and unlikely to succeed.  
 
213. Sandefur & Clarke, supra note 182, at 53. 
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215. 7 C.F.R. § 11.3(a) (2020) (defining adverse decisions).  
216. 7 C.F.R. §§ 11.5–10. 
217. Parkin, supra note 172, at 1366 n.272; Lens, supra note 51, at 53. 
218. Lens, supra note 51, at 53–54 (warning that alternative and less formal procedures may 
work against poorer and more disadvantaged individuals, who may lose procedural protections that 
compensate for their lack of power).  
219. Sandefur & Clarke, supra note 182, at 52.  
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In reconsidering the prior due process reform movement, some critics believe 
that the push for benefits hearings ended up harming recipients by masking injustice 
without ultimately gaining much in terms of greater benefits.220 Critics also raise 
concerns about the lawyer-based, adversarial nature of the hearing process.221  
One lesson is to ensure that recipient voices are centered and empowered in 
the reform movement. For example, the mostly women of color who led welfare 
rights movement fought to change how people understood aid to the poor.222 
Current student debt organizing efforts along these lines focus on the right to 
education and eliminating the debt-based foundation of our federal student aid 
system.  
This is essential, but there is still a question whether including borrower voices 
can truly disrupt the corruption in the current system. Former Department 
employee and whistleblower Jon Oberg has referred to the Department’s revolving 
door and related corruption as “the iron triangle.”223 According to Oberg,  
An iron triangle at either the state or federal level is a lobbying association’s 
dream, always sought and often achieved. One corner is the lobbying 
group; another is the staff of an elected official in the legislative branch 
with jurisdiction over the subject area; in the third corner are the officials 
in the executive branch who administer the relevant government programs. 
The goal is to get the lobbying association’s own people in charge of all the 
corners. This is done by means of the “revolving door,” through which 
like-minded people sympathetic to the lobby group fill and then rotate 
among the corner positions, moving from one to another as  
opportunities arise.224  
Oberg and others call for a different approach to reforming federal student aid, 
focusing not on incompetence as the main culprit for the dismal administration, but 
on corruption.225 
Challenging corruption and restructuring oversight should be coupled with 
reforms to eliminate the punitive collection powers and simplify the student aid 
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programs. This should include ending default through automatic payment or other 
simplification proposals, ending punitive collection powers such as Social Security 
offsets, and implementing safety net reform including restoration of student loan 
bankruptcy rights. 
These measures are critical, but the most important reform is to move away 
from a student aid system based on debt. As long as loans are the centerpiece of 
federal aid, the punitive collection agenda will continue to overshadow all other 
government priorities.226 A comprehensive analysis is beyond the scope of this 
Article, but key components include broad debt cancellation, free public college 
programs, banning federal aid to for-profit schools, and providing resources and 
structure for rigorous government oversight. 227 
CONCLUSION 
To build a case for real reform of federal student aid, we must, as professor of 
higher education policy and sociology Sara Goldrick-Rab argues, “stop counting 
who gets what dollars and think in terms of who gets what benefits . . . . [This] is a 
public problem and needs to be treated like one.”228 Ultimately, this will only occur 
once there are few or possibly no borrowers in default needing to request collection 
hearings in the first place.  
In the words of one borrower seeking defense to repayment relief after 
attending a fraudulent school:  
Nobody can get a straight answer on the status of their loans, and the 
Department continues to collect when they’re not supposed to. It crushes 
people. We’re stuck. It’s a really difficult place to be, to deal with that 
mentally and financially.  
  In a system that forces you go to go school, it’s really discouraging to 
have this experience. It makes you not want to invest in this system that 
we’ve been told works for everybody.229  
As this borrower attests, denying procedural justice can lead individuals to give 
up even trying to seek redress.  
The illusion of a fair system can lead to more than a cynical citizenry. It 
threatens the very concept of citizenship. As Professor Danielle Allen explains, no 
one wants to feel subject to, and “at the mercy of, the will of powerful others, to 
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whom they are invisible.”230 It is worse than nothing for so many borrowers to get 
a pretend chance to fight back. We can and must do better.  
 
230. Danielle Allen, The Road from Serfdom: How Americans Can Become Citizens Again, 
ATLANTIC (Dec. 2019), https://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/2019/12/danielle-allen-
american-citizens-serfdom/600778/ [https://perma.cc/Y2FM-YK2H]. 
